Hegemony of Indian Army over MoD

It’s a question that has begun to make my head hurt. It isn’t a lazy rhetorical question either. And it’s a question I suspect (or at least hope) disturbs a lot of people in this country. Because if there’s one thing that’s certain in this inclement, hateful time, it is this: the Indian Army needs saving. And fast. Nothing can be worse than a country desensitized to the idea of instability and tumult in the Army. The end begins when citizens expect little more than bad news from the barracks or South Block.

Well, I hate to do this, but there’s actually some worse news: Of those who have the power to fix the Army, who hold offices that put them in a position to actually do something to recover from a dangerous situation, there is nobody (at least nobody I can think of) who inspires a splinter of confidence. Here they are, and here’s why I think they can’t:

First, Defence Minister A.K.Antony. As the principal antagonist in the unfinishing face-off with Chief of Army Staff General Vijay Kumar Singh over his age and tenure, he has demonstrated, with resounding consistency, that he probably doesn’t have (a) the necessary proficiency and judgement to actually salvage such a festering situation, and (b) the very willingness to accept — until it is clearly way to late — that there is a problem. The age row stands as a glittering example of this unfortunate ineptitude. Unfortunate, because Mr Antony isn’t by any stretch a bad man. Just that he almost definitely doesn’t have what it takes to fix the collateral victim of this very personal war: the Indian Army itself.

Second, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. As someone who was drawn into the Antony-General face-off by a letter that the Chief addressed directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister, he cannot say he was wasn’t part of the discourse or that there wasn’t an opportunity for him to intervene and ensure a settlement. His refusal (or failure) to recognise a desperately ominous situation doesn’t say much about his abilities to fix things. The person who has the power to fix the Army needs to be proactive, nimble and the resilient enough to (a) recognise that there is a problem, and (b) work through it. Dr Singh doesn’t fit.

Third, Sonia Gandhi. Several armed forces chiefs have had an equation with the UPA chairperson, including two former Chiefs from the Army and Navy. Somehow, it doesn’t look like the Army is, or ever will be, a priority. She could certainly ensure that the two people named above get off their chairs and actually chase down a solution, but she’s got way too much else on her mind. So no chance.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the man who will lead the Army from the afternoon of May 31, Lt Gen Bikram Singh, takes office in the most unhappy of circumstances for civil-military relations. The general will be perceived to be an establishment man, as someone who the government ensured becomes Chief despite a massive age row campaign that would have put him out of the reckoning if the government had lost the age case in Supreme Court. Going simply by human nature, therefore, he has no reason to rock the boat — indeed, there may be an element of gratitude in his approach to his duties. And since anyone who wishes to save the Indian Army needs to be fearless of confrontation and friction, it is unlikely that Bikram Singh will have any incentive to go out on a limb to do anything dramatic or revolutionary. Of course, I may be completely wrong — and to be fair, few people know Lt Gen Bikram Singh well — but let’s just say that if he did manage to fix the Army in his circumstances, or even try, the country should be seriously surprised.

The bureaucracy? Good one! It’s too busy being chuffed about cutting the Army chief to size in the age row, and will perhaps therefore be even more condescending and difficult in future dealings. The chances of the MoD bureaucracy driving change are never promising even at in good times. (A notable exception is the Ajai Vikram Singh Committee report that gave the Army a younger profile and more efficient promotion system, but the former Defence Secretary only headed the committee — it was largely driven by the Army itself.)