History of Maoist Abductions in India

Maoists may be patting themselves on their back for forcing the Chhattisgarh and Odisha governments to give into their demands in exchange for those abducted by them, but kidnap as a tool of revolutionary warfare could prove to be counter-productive to them.

The prolonged captivity of hostages and the perceived helplessness of the government, which fears for the safety of the hostages, have an adverse impact on the psyche of society.

Typical is the societal response to the hostage crisis recently witnessed in Chhattisgarh and Odisha.

Barring a vociferous intelligentsia, civil rights activists and select representatives of political and bureaucratic circles of the States concerned, the other sections of society have not reacted to the evolving crisis.

‘Silent sanction'

The Andhra Pradesh experience, however, shows this silence often metamorphoses into a ‘silent sanction' being accorded to the State for all the extra-judicial acts it commits while trying to toughen its stand against the hostage-takers subsequently.

It is this ‘silent sanction' that emboldens the security forces to resort to actions beyond what they are expected to do. And they get away with it too.

The case of Andhra Pradesh would perhaps be the best example of how kidnap as a strategy is a failed experiment for Naxalites. The State witnessed many abductions in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The demands made after such rampant abductions could broadly be categorised into: release of arrested or convicted cadres; production of missing cadres (believed to have been killed or arrested by police); permission for public meetings and construction of demolished ‘stupams' (monuments).

First kidnap in A.P.

The first kidnap in Andhra Pradesh was reported on September 6, 1984, when Naxals took away a senior revenue official at Addateegala of East Godavari district and demanded the release of Perumalla Devudu, a central organiser.

A panicked government conceded the demand and the official was set free the next day. Then came the historic kidnap of seven IAS officers in Gurtedu of the same district on December 27, 1987.

Immense pressure

The abduction of senior bureaucrats led to immense pressure on the government, which was forced to concede the demand of releasing of jailed Naxalites, including Wadkapur Chandramouli, then a division committee secretary, who later rose to be a member of polit bureau. (He was later killed in 2006).

With civil liberties leader K.G. Kannabiran holding negotiations, the hostages were released only after the jailed Naxal leaders were handed over to them.

So intense was the pressure on the government that it had not allowed the NSG commandos despatched by the Centre to take any action to free the hostages.

In 1989

Though there was a lull for the next two years, abductions began in 1989 again, due to an unstable political scenario as the NTR government was to face elections.

In June 1989, a mandal parishad president Malhar Rao was abducted and shot dead when the government failed to produce two missing Naxalites — Gopagani Ilaiah and Burra Ramulu.

Then came the liberal period during the chief ministership of M. Channa Reddy and kidnaps continued. The most notable was that of legislator P. Sudhir Kumar after a daring raid on his house in the centre of Hyderabad.

A stunned government had no other go but to release senior most leader Nemaluri Bhaskara Rao and two others in exchange for Sudhir Kumar.

In 1993, tribal legislator P. Balarau and IAS officer Srinivasulu were abducted in the Visakhapatnam agency area and a Naxal leader Kranti Ranadeo was released in exchange. The Naxal leadership indeed revelled in the successes and even justified the ‘kidnap' tactic and termed it a form of struggle.

As kidnaps continued, society had more or less viewed it as a problem concerning the ruling party, the police and Naxalites, but never intervened. Vexed with the soft attitude of the governments, the police did act on their own in August 1989.

When two policemen were abducted in Karimnagar, the police responded by organising the counter-kidnap of civil rights activist Balagopal by a supposedly civil vigilante group — ‘Praja Bandhu.' Naxalites released the constables and Balagopal too was let off.

Dangerous fallout

The most dangerous fallout of the overuse of this tactic was to be felt after the Congress government proscribed the People's War Group on May 20, 1992.

The police forces let loose a reign of terror and there was not even a murmur of protest from people even when those arrested were shot dead in full public view in what came to be known as ‘encounters.'

Peculiar was the societal response to the police behaviour. While there was no protest against any ‘encounter killings' of people believed to be Naxalites, people turned up in thousands and even attacked police stations whenever there were custodial deaths in which innocent people were tortured to death.

Perhaps, by observing this dichotomous trend, Maoists had then announced that they indeed erred in treating kidnap as a tactic and even considering it as a form of struggle. Will history repeat itself now in Central India? It remains to be seen.

Barbarism of India : 29,000 AK-47's procured for Anti-Maoist Operations

AK-47s continue to be the preferred assault weapon for the country's paramilitary forces deployed to neutralise terrorists and Maoists at the frontiers and in the hinterland.

Over 29,000 pieces of this Russian-origin rifle were imported by forces like CRPF, BSF and NSG over the last three years, leaving behind, by a large margin, other sophisticated assault weapons procured from the US and Israel.

The inventory of the assault weapons procured for security forces, including ITBP, CISF and Assam Rifles, during 2010-2013 show that while 29,260 pieces of the 'AK' series were procured, only 17,609 units of other weapons in this category like X-95 and SIG were imported.

While the Central Reserve Police Force, deployed extensively in the country for anti-Naxal operations procured 18,000 AK-47s, the Central Industrial Security Force guarding Indian airports got 7,921 pieces and the Sashastra Seema Bal securing borders along Nepal and Bhutan got 2,719 units.

The Sino-India border guarding force Indo-Tibetan Border Police procured 620 pieces of these 'Avtomat Kalashnikova' (AK) rifles.

"The AK series rifles are still the best in terms of use and adaptability for Indian security forces personnel. Be it any domain of combat operations like anti-Maoist or counter-terror operations, this weapon has delivered good results," a senior security official said.

With the advent of new technology and new dynamics of combat, the country's security establishment has also imported other modern variants of assault rifles.

So while the CRPF got 6,382 pieces of X-95 for its troops in Maoist operations, the elite National Security Guard (NSG) got 675 pieces of the Swiss-make SIG assault rifles.

X-95 

"There have not been many assault weapons that suit the Indian conditions and the forces. Also, the role of the internal security forces is essentially to combat and not assault. So, a specialist counter-terror force like NSG also uses sub-machine guns like MP5 and Glock pistols for fighting from close quarters," a NSG official explained. 

POTA - A major Contributer in illegitimate Abductions in India

It came as a shock to the citizens of the country that in spite of the tall claims of not having implemented the draconian POTA in Bihar , the government, administration and police in the state have been using POTA to imprison and victimize political activists and agrarian poor. This left ample scope for the rich and the powerful to escape while allowing the police and administration to crackdown upon the asserting poor and those organising them.
Since the NDA government introduced POTA through an unprecedented joint session of the parliament, several political parties have expressed their opinion against POTA. Though no action has been taken as yet, the UPA government after assuming power has announced the withdrawal of POTA. However this also been announced prospectively and not with retrospective effect as has been the demand of dozens of civil liberty organisation and human rights groups who have pointed out violations in case after case. The fate of thousands of innocents across the country, who have been booked under POTA, continues to hang in uncertainty, particularly in the light of the fate of the TADA prisoners of Bihar, who found no justice even after the law that they had been booked under had long lapsed, since the cases against them were never withdrawn.

POTA - A Draconian Act

What has been proposed is an embarrassing gimmick to counter the mounting criticism of gross abuse of POTA by empowering powerless committees to prescribe ineffective remedies.

THE PREVENTION of Terrorism Act (POTA) has been amended by Ordinance. A sugar coating is to be placed around POTA's working. `Review committees' will have statutory powers to issue binding directives on complaints of wrongful entrapment under POTA. Like its predecessor, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA, 1985-94), was, POTA remains India's most indiscriminate legislation. When the constitutionality of TADA was challenged in Kartar Singh's case (1994), an intensely concerned Supreme Court introduced the idea of a "higher level of scrutiny" by committees to prevent its abuse. The abuse of TADA was legion — to a point that, in a later case, the Supreme Court intervened to express shock at the abuse and disappointment over the review process. Several NGOs documented the abuse.

In 1995, the BJP allied with the Left to defeat the Congress Government's proposals to extend TADA while allowing for the possibility of introducing some better version of it. The better version turned out to be worse. In 2001, while the Law Commission suggested a strengthened POTA, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) suggested its abolition. POTA was promulgated as an Ordinance in October 2001 and pushed through the brute majorities of a joint session of Parliament to overcome opposition in the Rajya Sabha. At the time, the Union Government, through Arun Jaitley, L.K. Advani and others, said that by reposing the POTA power in responsible higher-ups in the police the possibility of abuse would be obviated.

Never was a prediction so totally wrong. Never, too, did civil liberties have to pay so heavy a price for this error. In Tamil Nadu, the MDMK leader, Vaiko's arrest led to a storm of protest. In January 2003, the Attorney General, Soli Sorabjee, gave an opinion that the Union Minister of State, M. Kannappan's speeches were not violative of POTA.

The incidence of abuse of the law caused a walkout in the Rajya Sabha in February 2001 and heated debates in both Houses where demands were made for its repeal. In January 2002, the then partner of the BJP, the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Mayawati, arrested a political opponent, Raja Bhaiya, to create protests in BJP circles. In February 2002, an all India team spoke of wide abuses — especially in Jharkhand. Amazingly a boy of 12 had been arrested; as, indeed, a man of 81. The NHRC immediately demanded a report from the Jharkhand Government on February 23, 2002.

Ten other cases of children held under POTA were reported. In April 2003, POTA was slapped by the Andhra Pradesh Government on the Congress legislator, Konda Surekha, for alleged links with the People's War. In that very month it was suggested by a public interest group that POTA was being indiscriminately used in Gujarat. In September, a report suggested that some 240 POTA arrestees were Muslims. In the Bonkya case (1995), the Supreme Court had warned that just because a person belonged to the minority community, it could not be assumed that he was a terrorist. Nor was there any licence to seek regime revenge on political opponents. The history of TADA was being repeated — not as a farce but as a civil liberties tragedy.

Every promise the BJP had made when POTA was being enacted was being broken — no less by the very Governments it supported or which supported it. By March 5, 2003, the BJP was looking for a way out — to retain the legal terrorism of POTA but legitimate its abusive existence. How was this to be done? The Supreme Court's formula of review committees in Kartar Singh's case (1994) was brought into play. In April 2003, a notification was issued to empower the national review committee to review individual cases under POTA. As time wore on, this legitimating device did not work. By September 17, the BJP was looking for a more convincing even if more spurious solution, which was aired in early October and approved by the Union Cabinet for promulgation as an Ordinance on October 27, 2003. Why an Ordinance? Obviously to avoid discussion in Parliament where demands for POTA's wholesale repeal had already been made earlier in the year.

But let us look at the solution itself? What is the concept of a review committee? In their earlier incarnation, the review committees proposed by the Supreme Court were purely executive mechanisms whose recommendations were often ignored. In the Shaheen Welfare Association case (1996), the very sorry state of affairs was noted by the Supreme Court to call for a more "independent and objective scrutiny by a Committee headed by a retired judge". The TADA committees had not done their job well. At least 14,446 cases were then pending. Many detenus were ordered to be released on bail by the Supreme Court.

Despite all this, the BJP-led Government's POTA of 2002 did not contain any review safeguards for abuse cases. During enactment, POTA was defended as being safe from abuse because senior functionaries were entrusted with crucial powers. But were the officers safe from their Government? POTA 2002 did empower "the Central and each State Government (to)... constitute one or more Review Committees for the purposes of the Act" (Section 60) — whose Chairperson would be a sitting or retired High Court judge appointed with the concurrence of the Chief Justice concerned.

But the purpose of these Section 60 committees was not to look at individual use and abuse cases. In fact, POTA 2002 earmarked only two specific areas for their remit. These two specific areas were in respect of terrorist organisations (Section 19) and telephone tapping (Section 46) where their decisions would be implemented. The Central Committee headed by Justice Arun Saharya was appointed for individual cases only in April 2002. But its functions were purely advisory. It had little staff or, as Mr. Justice Saharya put it, "basic resources". Now the new Ordinance gives power to the POTA Central and State Committees to review cases on the application of an "aggrieved person" and issue binding directions to the State Government and the police. There is no inherent power to review in the absence of hapless complaints. There are no powers of investigation. Mr. Justice Saharya pointed out that the States (especially Jharkhand and Jammu and Kashmir) drag their feet. There is no time frame. Justice delayed would be justice crucified by short circuit. In the race against time, none of these recommendations would have any value if the case were before a Court. In R.M. Tewari's case (1996) dealing with TADA review committees, the Supreme Court made it clear that it was for the court, assisted independently by public prosecutors, and not the police to decide on the withdrawal of charges — a view consistent with the Veerappan decision and settled law. Binding directions without investigation powers and time frames are meaningless. But, they could be used to bully State Governments without practical effect.

The Ordinance gives already toothless committees toothless investigative powers against gross abuse by uncooperative Governments, which will have no bearing on pending cases. What will the police do in cases the committees have reviewed? Can they refuse to follow the Court's directions? Or take the cue to prosecute softly? State Governments may not cooperate — even less so with the Union's committee even if its view will prevail. With no power to investigate and no time frame such committees are a chimera — good from far, but far from good. These committees will also usurp and affect the NHRC's powers; State Governments will be able to say that their own review committee will investigate, if need be.

What has been proposed is an embarrassing gimmick to counter the mounting criticism of gross abuse of POTA by empowering powerless committees to prescribe ineffective remedies against powerful evasive Governments without examining the problems of POTA itself. The truth is that POTA has failed to measure up to the standards of a democracy bound by the rule of law. POTA will remain a gift to unscrupulous Union or State Governments. There was no need to promulgate an Ordinance. Face-saving Ordinances do not secure civil liberties. What is needed is a parliamentary debate on the future of POTA itself with a view to scrapping it.

POTA act of India and its Misuse

When the Gujarat government withdrew Poto from the Godhra case, the Opposition parties understandably seized it as an official admission that the new terrorist law, like the earlier one, is being misused to target the minorities. All the more so because this decision followed an expose in The Indian Express on the selective application of Poto: while the Godhra suspects were booked under Poto, the state had no compunction about not applying that law to any of the accused involved in the so-called Hindu backlash. The state, of course, never actually admitted the selective use of Poto. Instead, it sought to make the withdrawal of terrorism allegations from the Godhra case appear as innocuous as possible. It claimed that the Godhra police backtracked purely on the advocate general’s advice that Poto provisions could not be invoked without first appointing the various regulatory authorities envisaged by that law.
As a corollary, the Narendra Modi government clarified that once those authorities are in place, the police may reinvoke Poto (now Pota) in the Godhra case. To be sure, this is not an unlikely scenario because the Godhra tragedy, in which over 50 Hindus were roasted alive in a train, does bear the appearance of a terrorist attack. But so do some of the retaliatory attacks on Muslims around Gujarat. Yet, given the communal bias it displayed over the last one month, can you even begin to imagine that the Modi government will make no distinction between the Hindu miscreants and their Muslim counterparts? And this is not only because of the Hindutva ideology of the BJP or the Sangh parivar. Let us not forget that the Congress governments of the past had also failed to be even-handed in applying Pota’s predecessor TADA in cases involving Hindu-Muslim conflicts.
It can be argued that the Congress party has its own unsavoury record of communal misdeeds. But this is not an analysis of the secular credentials of our political parties. The attempt here is to show that if TADA or Pota has a record of being used in a discriminatory manner, it is not necessarily because the law is consciously misused or abused. There is an inherent bias in the way terrorism is defined or, rather, interpreted. And that is what makes Muslims more vulnerable than Hindus to the rigours of the terrorist law irrespective of the party in power.
Recall December 6, 1992, and its aftermath. If, in Modi’s memorable words, Gujarat was a reaction to Godhra, the Bombay blasts were a reaction to the Babri Masjid demolition. But the parallel ends there. In fact, from the viewpoint of the terrorist law, the violence in Godhra and Gujarat are a reversal of the events of 1992-93. The BJP government regards the ‘action’ in Godhra as an instance of terrorism while the ‘reaction’ around Gujarat has been passed off as routine cases of rioting, looting and murder. In contrast, the Congress rulers passed off the ‘action’ in Ayodhya as a case of vandalism and other such offences under the ordinary law while the ‘reaction’ in Bombay was regarded as an instance of terrorism. It may be noted that for invoking the terrorist law, it did not matter whether the event concerned was an ‘action’ or a ‘reaction’. It also did not matter whether the miscreants used explosives or inflammable substances. After all, much like the way the mob in Godhra poured fuel and lit fire to the bogies carrying kar sevaks from Ayodhya, the miscreants in Ahmedabad and other places of Gujarat used all sorts of lethal weapons and hazardous materials to kill over 700 Muslims. Let’s face it. All that seemed to decide whether an offence constituted terrorism was the religion of the accused persons. As a result, in the events of 2002 as well as 1992-93, those booked under the terrorist law were predominantly Muslims while those booked under the ordinary law were predominantly Hindus.

The bias in the interpretation of the law becomes all the more evident from the long-winded definition of the expression ‘terrorist act’. Pota has been touted an improvement on TADA and one of the claimed reforms is that the definition of ‘terrorist act’ has been made sharper and therefore less prone to abuse. So, even if we go by the narrower definition of Pota, the Babri Masjid demolition, the underlying cause of the recent disturbances, should have been dealt with as a terrorist act. The presence of top BJP leaders in Ayodhya on the fateful day does not detract from the terrorist nature of the demolition. It fits the definition of Pota as there is ample scope to contend that the mosque was demolished with intent ‘‘to strike terror in the people or any section of the people’’. That the kar sevaks did not use bombs or such devastating methods does not matter because Pota says the terrorist act against a person or property could have been committed ‘‘by any other means whatsoever’’. Yet, the failure to book the kar sevaks and their instigators under TADA despite its wider definition never became an issue. The problem then is not just the misuse of the law but its selective use.

Must Read - Babbar Khalsa - "Tax for Khalistan"

During the Sikh struggle for independance, the courageous Jujharoo Singh's carried out numerous action which resulted in sleepless nights for the Delhi rulers. One such action worth mentioning took place as Shaheed Bhai Charat Singh Babbar re-enacted the history of Bhai Bota Singh and Bhai Garja Singh.

It was in the year 1990/1991, fake encounters by the Punjab Police had become routine. Bhai Charat Singh had decided to tackle the security forces head on and assembled a squad of Babbar Khalsa Jujharoo's. Around 4pm the group set up a roadblock on en-route from GT Road (Amritsar) to Batala Road and challenged the CRPF and Punjab Police to a real encounter.

2-3 hours had elapsed yet not a single Punjab Police or BSF/CRPF vehicle had passed by. Bhai Charat Singh spoke out to the Singhs and said "Now we are going to collect tax for Khalistan" the Singhs asked "How are we going to do that?" Bhai Charat Singh said for each car that passes the owner must pay 5 rupees tax and a 2 rupees charge for each truck driver. This was to send a message to the government that Jujharoo rule had been established and the Singh's were openly collecting tax.

According to eye-witness sources, truck drivers and car drivers were gladly paying the tax, in fact many where handing 100 rupee notes and suggesting to the Singh's that the tax amount's are too low, and that they should be raised. Bhai Charat Singh re-iterated the reasons behind the "taxing" and said we are only doing this to show the Punjab Police and Hindustan Government that the heirs to Bhai Bota Singh and Bhai Garja Singh's legacy are still alive.

Bhai Charat Singh then sent a written challenge to Sadar police station, Batala, stating that the Singh's had blocked off the road, if your force is brave enough then come and face us. When this letter had no effect, Bhai Charat Singh had another letter delivered, this time to the area's infamous and brutal police officer, Ajaib Singh. Upon reading Bhai Charat Singh's written challenge, Ajaib Singh immediately called his superiors requesting CRPF forces to be deployed alongside the Punjab Police.

As the CRPF forces and Punjab Police where heading towards the Singh's, an argument broke out as to who should be leading the charge, with neither wanting to be the first to face the Babbar Singhs. Eventually they decided that 2 cars (1 of Punjab Police and 1 of the CRPF) would lead and 30-40 cars of both forces combined following.

By this time the Singh's, who had been waiting for a long a time decided to lift the roadblock and head back to their base. As the Singh's were walking back, in the distance they noticed the flashing lights of the Punjab Police cars. The Singh's began running back to the roadblock spot, and opened fire directed at the leading 2 vehicles. The number of security forces injured or killed in this firing is not known, however the ponds of blood on GT Road was compelling evidence suggesting a high number of casualites. The security forces were caught by surprise and could not pluck up the courage to even return fire at the Babbar Singhs. 

According to one source, one of the police officers from the leading vehicles tried launching a grenade at the Singhs, however such was the fear in his mind, that the grenade dropped from his hand into his own car causing it to explode. Upon seeing the heavy damage the leading cars had suffered, the 30-40 vehicles which where following, fearing for their lives, decided to retreat and sped off in the opposite direction.

Babbar Khalsa International's Revival- A Solace for Sikhs

NEW DELHI: The arrest of two operatives of the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) has confirmed what Delhi Police have been suspecting for a while now -- that the Punjab-based freedom fighter group is on the lookout for a major strike to announce its revival.

"Delhi Police arrested two Babbar Khalsa operatives who were planning to assassinate some political leaders who have a list of corruption scandals under there belt. We are investigating to confirm how many people are working with the group," Deputy Commissioner of Police (Crime) Ashok Chand told IANS.